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I have to confess that, when asked to contribute an essay to this volume, 
I was inclined to say no. I had various reasons to hesitate. Although 
no demands were made about the exact content of the piece, I felt I 
had to write about Augustine’s Confessions (Confessiones). After all, an 
earlier piece of mine, which was also about the Confessions, had been 
the occasion for the request. I have to confess that I was not entirely 
satisfied with that earlier piece. I felt that I had not fully respected the 
form of the ‘confessions’, reducing my discussion entirely to Augustine’s 
invention of a new temporal vocabulary. I was not sure whether I 
could say anything beyond that. I also have to confess that, even while 
framing these notes as little ‘confessions’, I do not have access to the 
true form of a confession. As such, they are presented under a false 
name. Before they become a falsification of Augustine’s entire project, I 
have to strike them through, marking their intention to be confessions, 
while also signifying their failure to become such. As such, I present 
them here as notes that are on the verge of becoming confessions.
Some readers might now protest, saying: “Aren’t you forgetting 
something? You were explaining why you were not inclined to write 
this piece, and now suddenly the piece has already arrived.” The 
readers are right, of course. The piece had already arrived. In confessing 
to myself why I could not write about Augustine’s Confessions, I 
was already writing about it. And this mode of writing/non-writing 
somehow suited me and allowed me to say what I otherwise could not. 
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Another confession is in order. My own book of confessions, if I 
would ever write one, would probably be a point-by-point reversal 
of Augustine’s book, despite some occasional overlaps (a senseless 
theft, a mother who prays for the soul of her son). I started out 
as a devout Christian in my childhood and moved through some 
heterodox phases when I was a student. After finishing my studies 
in philosophy and comparative literature, I gradually became closer 
to what is usually identified as atheism. A tragi-comedy indeed: a 
tragedy insofar as it tells the story of losing faith (against one’s own 
will); a comedy insofar the one who lost faith (I, the undersigned) is 
still defined by this faith and cannot— would not, will not— shake 
it off. 
The condition of ‘having lost faith’ is fundamentally different 
from the condition of ‘not being religious’ or of ‘never having had 
faith.’ Despite the negation that both conditions share, only the 
first is ultimately defined by a loss. “This loss,” I told myself, “keeps 
manifesting itself as an absence.” Is anything gained therein? It’s hard 
to tell, really. The absence resists its proper place, forever shifting its 
internal economy of loss and gain.
Sometimes I simply want to denounce the absence. Here my tragic 
sense of self gives way to despair, while refusing to recognise its own 
comical nature, mistaking it instead for a deep insight. At other times, 
I try to find my way back to what I lost. When that happens, a form of 
despair seeps in that simply ignores the loss and I feel myself becoming 
utterly comical. Most of the time, however, I prefer the ambiguity of 
the in-between. The shifting economy of absence seems to suit me. It 
gives me access to multiple selves that will never coincide. Despair is 
still lurking under these multiple selves, but at least the comic and the 
tragic remain caught in an undecided balance, simultaneously opening 
up both sentiments. 
In his own ‘true’ Confessions, Augustine tells the story of several 
former selves some of which are children, some of which are teenagers, 
some of which are adults. All these earlier selves dissolve into the 
converted self he has become by the time he writes the Confessions. 
“Does it matter for our relationship to former selves,” I asked myself, 
“whether we have found faith or lost it?” I had the feeling that my 
former selves (religious as well as non-religious ones) gave me access 
to different viewpoints. As such, I did not feel the need to silence these 
selves or to actively denounce them. Augustine, on the other hand, 
seems to want to purge himself of the otherness of his former selves. 
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“Is that really his position, though?” I asked myself. “After all, he takes 
great pains to give these former selves a voice.”
I was not fully sure how Augustine sees his former selves. I did know, 
however, that for him the former selves would never dissolve into the 
current self. His conception of life was not linear, but was defined by 
an outside that breaks into that linearity. An ultimate otherness: God. 
“For, what am I for myself, without you,” Augustine writes, “but a guide 
unto destruction?”1 Another type of otherness prevails for Augustine. 
And even when he ultimately seeks unity from that otherness, he still 
respects it to a fault. I did not fully understand how, but that is how it 
appeared to me when reading the book. 
From the beginning, the Confessions present itself as a dialogue with 
God. Taking a cue from Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity 
(Das Wesen des Christentums), this dialogue can easily be dismissed as 
a projection of the self.2 This would imply that the divine otherness is 
1 Augustine, Confessiones, 4, 1, 1 (134): “Quid enim sum ego mihi sine te nisi dux 
in praeceps?”. (Bourke’s translation, slightly altered). I will cite the Latin text 
from the Loeb Classical Library Latin-English edition, referring to the page in 
that edition, followed by a more general reference, as is the common practice 
(e.g. [4, 1, 1], book 4, chapter 1, paragraph 1). Augustine, Confessions, Volume 
I: Books 1-8, trans. Carolyn J.B. Hammond (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014). Augustine, Confessions, Volume II: Books 9-13, trans. Carolyn J.B. 
Hammond (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). For this essay, I have 
retranslated most of the quoted passages, using Bourke’s translation as a starting 
point. Partly to modernise the translation (you instead of thou), partly because 
by translating the words myself I got a better grasp on the text (hence, I am most 
definitely not trying to improve Bourke’s translation or suggesting that there is 
anything wrong with it). Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Vernon J. Bourke 
(Catholic University of America Press, 1953). At times I have also consulted a 
German-Latin edition: Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones/Bekenntnisse: Lateinisch-
deutsch, trans. Wilhelm Thimme (Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler Verlag, 2004). In 
addition, some other English translations were consulted: the one by Hammond 
(in the already mentioned Loeb Classical Library edition) and the one by Boulding, 
Saint Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2012). Initially I also had access to a Dutch translation. Aurelius 
Augustinus, Belijdenissen, trans. Wim Sleddens (Eindhoven: Damon, 2018).
2 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. Marian Evans (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 74: “Man makes to himself an image of God, 
i.e., he converts the abstract Being of the reason, the Being of the thinking power,
into an object of sense or imagination. But he places this image in God himself,
because his want would not be satisfied if he did not regard this image as an 
objective reality, if it were nothing more for him than a subjective image, separate 
from God, — a mere figment devised by man.”
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nothing more than a mirror of one’s own fears and preferences. “Does 
this critique,” I asked myself once again, “really do justice to a position 
like that of Augustine?” Feuerbach’s views on religion (especially in 
the parroted versions in which one usually encounters them) had 
always seemed too confident to me, at times resembling those of the 
‘benign’ colonizer who, being overly convinced of his own truth, does 
not shy away from simply silencing the views of others. 
“How then,” I wondered, “does Augustine succeed to do justice 
to divine otherness in his attempted dialogue with God?” It was a 
huge question. Not allowing self-confidence, it demanded sensitivity 
instead. To respond to it, I first had to retrace my own encounters with 
the Confessions, uncovering my own access to the book. This would 
slowly enable me to articulate a (preliminary) response. 
Becoming a Reader of the Confessions
In good Aristotelian fashion, I had to begin from the beginning: my 
first, youthful encounter with the Confessions, heavily determined by 
the milieu in which it took place. I grew up in a Protestant household 
in which religion was initially more a practical than an intellectual 
concern. Despite that we had many theology books at home. “Where 
did these books come from?” I often wondered. “Nobody ever seems 
to read them.” Later I learned that my grandfather, who was a car 
mechanic at a big transportation company, used to read and write 
about theology in his limited spare time. It was from him that our 
household inherited a small library that was filled with intimidating 
volumes of (Calvinist) Protestant theology, written by figures like Karl 
Barth or Herman Bavinck.
Within this little library there was not much to draw the attention 
of a schoolboy, however pious that boy might have been. Of all 
these books, my former self only studied the enormous, 3-volume 
brown book that carried the title Institutes of the Christian Religion 
(Institutio Christianae Religionis) and was written by the French 
reformer John Calvin.3 “Why did I even open that book?” I asked 
myself, unsure whether I could trust my ever-fading memories. 
3 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 1, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. 
Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006). 
The Dutch edition I encountered in my youth must have been the following: 
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“Didn’t it have something to do with swearwords?” It slowly came 
back to me now. Calvin was supposed to be well versed in fulminating 
against dissenters. Some older guys I knew had even compiled a list of 
Calvinist retorts that could be used for ranting and raving Protestant 
style. They were not willing to share it with me so I had to create my 
own list. I found some appropriate phrases (appropriate to me, that 
is) like ‘deadly pestilences’ and ‘wriggling snakes’. However, I was not 
too impressed by them and the sheer length of the book exhausted me. 
Before long I put it away. 
While leafing through the pages of Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, my former self must have found a few remarks that pleased 
me. If my memory could be trusted, these remarks concerned the 
authority of the church. “A subject close to your heart,” my memory 
told me, “as you would always try to provoke that authority.” These 
remarks must have pushed me to go back to Calvin again. The relevant 
section was called ‘Augustine cannot be cited as counter evidence.’ 
It starts as follows: “Indeed, I know that statement of Augustine is 
commonly referred to, that he would not believe the gospel if the 
authority of the church did not move him to do so.”4 At the time, the 
name Augustine did not mean much to me, but it somehow invoked 
the pope and the “accursed idolatry” of the mass of which article 80 
of our Heidelberg Catechism spoke (much to my frustration we had to 
learn these articles by heart).5 That only increased my curiosity.
“Two things struck you upon reading this section,” my memory 
told me about my former self. “Was it really my memory?” I wondered 
later. In any case, two things stood out. First, although the quoted 
Johannes Calvijn, Institutie of onderwijzing in de christelijke godsdienst, trans. A. 
Sizoo (Delft: Meinema, 1931).
4 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 76. Calvin refers here to Augustine’s 
Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti v, as quoted in English in 
footnote 6 on the same page: “For my part, I should not believe the gospel except 
as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church.”
5 Various authors, “The Heidelberg Catechism” in Lyle D. Bierma, The Theology 
of the Heidelberg Catechism: a reformation synthesis (Louisville, Kentucky: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2013), 171. In this version the earlier phrasing of 
‘accursed idolatry’ (‘vervloekte afgoderij,’ in Dutch) has been tuned down to the 
slightly more tolerant ‘condemnable idolatry’. In my youth, I encountered article 
80 in the so-called ‘church book’ that included a rhymed version of the psalms, the 
‘three forms of unity’ (among which the Heidelberg catechism), and some other 
liturgical forms. Various authors, Gereformeerd Kerkboek (Heerenveen: Uitgeverij 
Jongbloed 1986). 
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sentence from Augustine seemed to affirm the authority of the church, 
Calvin immediately turned it upon its head and came to the opposite 
conclusion, suggesting that the “faith we hold in the scriptures” does not 
“depend upon the assent or judgment of the church.”6 A neat rhetorical 
trick. “You knew instinctively,” my memory assured me, “that you would 
be able to use this trick to your own advantage.” The second thing that 
stood out had to do with the fact that Calvin himself—still considered 
to be one of the founders of the Reformed Church (Liberated) that I 
was born into—already disputed the authority of the church. “You 
would exploit this point,” my memory said, “in your ongoing disputes 
with the reverend during Bible classes.” It was only later that I learned 
that this view was typical for Protestantism in general. The reverend 
must have been less impressed by my arguments than I imagined it 
back then. 
“It must have been a few months later,” my memory stated with 
a confidence that ringed slightly false, “that you came across a copy 
of Augustine’s Confessions in the public library.” By that time I had 
become interested in Augustine and someone had told me that the 
Confessions would provide a good entry point into his work. “More 
importantly,” my memory added, “you had heard that it was supposed 
to be an astonishingly good read in comparison to other books on 
these matters.”
The library book in question was most probably the first edition 
of Gerard Wijdeveld’s Dutch translation of the Confessions, published 
in 1963.7 “It was a worn out copy,” my memory reminded me, “that 
smelled like dust and stale coffee and was heavily marked by 
underlines and small notes of various kinds.” The handwriting of one 
particular person appeared again and again, expressing dissatisfaction 
in a rather direct way. Remarks like ‘nonsense!’, ‘liar!’, and ‘this has 
been refuted many times!’ were written in broad strokes throughout 
the book. There was such a stark contrast between these impudent 
remarks and the self-effacing tone of Augustine’s text that they often 
set me off laughing. 
At later moments, I would encounter the handiwork of this ‘critical’ 
reviewer several times again in other books I borrowed from the same 
library. These futile attempts at censorship provided an interesting 
6 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 77.
7 Augustinus, De Belijdenissen van Aurelius Augustinus, trans. Gerard Wijdeveld 
(Baarn: Uitgeverij de Fontein, 1963).
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counter perspective on the censure project in which the mum of one 
of my friend’s was heavily engaged. “Every time you see a curse word 
in your library book,” she would tell us, “you take a black pen and cross 
it out.” “Of course,” my memory assured me, “you never did any such 
thing. Instead, whenever you encountered a crossed out sentence, you 
would try to guess the curse word that was hidden there. This made 
the reading all the more fun.”
“A few years later,” my memory remarked wryly, “you learned that 
Gerard Wijdeveld, the Dutch translator of the Confessions, had been 
a collaborator of the Nazis during the Second World War. In fact, he 
even published an ode to Adolf Hitler.” Not very promising conditions 
for a first encounter with Augustine! It is the mark of a great book 
that, even when filtered by the mind of a former Nazi sympathizer 
and accompanied by discouraging remarks, the core of the text still 
remains intact. That is why, despite the biased framework in which my 
former self encountered it, the Confessions got through to me more or 
less unscathed. 
From the first pages onwards I was struck by the direct way in 
which Augustine addressed God: “Tell me through your mercies, Lord 
my God, what you are to me. Say to my soul, ‘I am your salvation’.”8 
There was a strange mixture of audacity and humility in this address 
that, at least initially, reminded me of the way one of our reverends 
spoke to God in his prayers. “At Sunday service,” my memory told me, 
“this reverend would often use the moment for prayers to comment on 
small issues within the community or to give his viewpoint on larger 
political events.” 
“We rest assured, O Lord,” the reverend would pray, “that you would 
condemn these sins even stronger than we do.” “We realise. O God,” 
he would state at other times, “that you have hardened the hearts 
of our enemies. We are confident you will give us the patience and 
perseverance to hold on to our rightful demands.” In these prayers the 
humility of speaking to God was mixed with the audacity of speaking 
in the name of God. As if the audacity was somehow justified by the 
humility that preceded it. “It seemed to you,” my memory assured 
me, “that this double rhetoric relied on the principle of impersonating 
God for personal gain; the same principle that also underlay the many 
atrocities that have been committed in the name of God throughout 
8 conf. 1, 5, 5 (trans. based on Bourke): “Dic mihi per miserationes tuas, domine 
deus meus, quid sis mihi. dic animae meae, ‘salus tua ego sum’.”
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the ages.” From my (at the time rather purist) perspective, such an 
attempt to impersonate God ultimately came down to a blasphemous 
reversal of the incarnation.
Even though my former self sensed a similar mixture of humility 
and audacity in Augustine’s Confessions, it somehow seemed to differ 
from the Reverend’s prayer. “At the time,” my memory said, “you could 
not yet articulate that difference, but you felt it had something to do 
with the personal tone in which Augustine wrote. As well as the way 
in which he constantly incorporates quotations from the Bible into his 
discourse.”
A Dialogue with God
For a long time, I did not know how to approach what I had — 
provisionally — called Augustine’s dialogue with God. It appeared to 
me that Augustine, in an accidental and indirect way, had re-invented 
the Platonic dialogue and had turned it into a new Christian genre. “It 
is true,” I told myself, “that the genre of the Confessions shows family 
resemblances with the hagiography and the autobiography. But most 
certainly it cannot be reduced to these genres.” The Greek words 
‘hagios’ (holy) and ‘autos’ (self) are in flagrant contradiction with the 
intention of the Confessions. Augustine tries to stay clear of any claim of 
holiness and only highlights his own ‘self ’ to immediately question it. 
“Is the Platonic dialogue,” I asked myself, “not a far more appropriate 
predecessor for Augustine’s dialogue with God?” Both types of 
dialogues can be seen as true dia logoi in which at least two different 
voices emerge. However, contrary to what one would expect, it is not 
the dialogue form itself that frames these two voices. Instead the two 
voices emerge within the discourse of a single speaker, incorporating 
true otherness within the discourse of the self. A more extensive study 
would be needed to fully examine this hidden affinity between Plato 
and Augustine in terms of genre. At this point, it was no more than a 
tentative suggestion allowing me, at least for the time being, to pin 
down where Augustine’s discourse differs from that of the reverend I 
encountered in the church of my youth. 
My contention was that Augustine is keenly aware of the dangers 
of his approach and takes pains to ensure that the ‘voice of God’, which 
he invokes within his own speech, is carefully constructed on the basis 
of unmarked quotations from the Bible. As a trained philosopher and 
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literary scholar, moulded by the ideas of Boris Uspensky’s A Poetics of 
Composition and Mikhail Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, I 
was well aware of how common it is that more than one voice manifests 
itself in the discourse of a single speaker.9 When a mother says to 
her child, “Let mummy help you,” she is referring to herself (‘me’) 
from the perspective of the child (‘mummy’), subtly incorporating 
the perspective and voice of that child in her own speech. Everyday 
language is constantly being dialogised in this manner and this is 
exactly what allows us to take up the perspective of someone else or 
even to speak with the voice of the other. “How do we do this,” I asked 
myself, “without projecting our own viewpoints on the other person 
that is invoked in this way? Or rather, how does Augustine do it?”
From the first page onwards, it is clear that Augustine is directly 
addressing God. “You are great, Lord, and greatly to be praised. Your 
power is great and of your wisdom there is no number.”10 How does 
he balance the humility of this address with the audacity of speaking 
to God in such a lengthy and elaborate way? Augustine’s first strategy 
is ensuring that he speaks to God without saying anything about him 
that was not first said by God. He does so by interweaving his text with 
quotations and paraphrases from the Bible. As O’Donnell remarks, 
references to at least four different Bible verses can be found in the 
just quoted opening passage only (Ps 47:2;95:4, 144:3 and Tob 13:1).11 
This subtle art of plagiarizing God alone is not enough to set Augustine 
 9 Boris Andreevich Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic 
Text and Typology of a Compositional Form, trans. Valentina Zavarin and Sussan 
Wittig (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970). Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
 10 conf. 1, 1, 1 (trans. Based on Bourke): “Magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde. 
magna virtus tua et sapientiae tuae non est numerus.” James O’Donnell remarks 
about this passage: “There have been various attempts to find precedents for this 
form of opening, but in the history of Latin literature, its originality and oddity 
are clear. Most Latin prose works begin with a dedicatory epistle or a formal 
proem: this work has neither. It begins abruptly, with speech directed to a silent 
God — but speech chosen from the words of that God himself. The first sentence 
is followed by a reflective pause for inquiry, which should not blur the main 
purpose: invocation, an opening more appropriate to poetry than prose.” James 
O’Donnell, Augustine Confessions: Volume 2: Commentary, Books 1-7 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 9.
 11 Ibid.
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apart from the reverend I spoke about earlier.12 After all, it is quite easy 
to selectively quote from the Bible and take unwarranted conclusions 
from it, ascribing one’s own views to God.
Kenneth Burke’s study ‘Verbal Action in St. Augustine’s Confessions’ 
gave me some pointers for a better understanding of the continuous 
interaction between ego (I) and tu (‘you’ or ‘thou’) that structures 
Augustine’s text as a whole.13 Burke’s book provided a good insight 
into the way that Augustine adapts the Latin of the Vulgate to the flow 
of his text, without twisting the text for his own purposes. “It does not 
fully reveal, though,” I said to myself, “how Augustine’s text escapes 
Feuerbach’s projection charge.” To get to that point, I had to take a 
little detour.
A Detour: “O my theft”
The detour was set in motion by an intriguing passage in Book 2 of the 
Confessions that Burke briefly discusses, without analyzing it fully. It 
appears almost in the middle of the famous story about the pear theft; 
Augustine’s personal variation on the fall of Adam and Eve. “What 
did I [ego], poor wretch, love in you [in te]?”14 Augustine asks there, 
carefully repeating the ego/tu dynamic that was, by then, familiar to 
me. The first time I read the sentence, I sort of expected that the tu in 
question would, of course, be God. “Wait a minute,” I said to myself, 
“that cannot be true. Isn’t the love put in question here? That does 
not fit in with the general pattern of the Confessions now does it?” I 
quickly realized that the address had shifted from God to another tu. 
In classical rhetoric such a “diversion [aversus] of our address” from 
the immediate addressee to someone or something else is called an 
 12 There is an interesting link here between Augustine and Johannes Climacus, 
the pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Crumbs or a Crumb 
of Philosophy, who accuses himself of plagiarism. For more on this, see: Martijn 
Boven, “The Incognito of a Thief: Johannes Climacus and the Poetics of Self 
Incrimination,” in The Kierkegaardian Mind, ed. Adam Buben, Eleanor Helms, and 
Patrick Stokes (London: Routledge 2019), 409-420.
 13 Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1970), 43-171.
 14 conf. 2, 6 , 12 (my translation, based on Bourke): “Quid ego miser in te amavi….”
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apostrophe.15 It is usually announced by an exclamation like the one 
that follows the already-quoted line from Augustine (O my…). The 
whole passage reads:
What did I [ego], poor wretch, love in you [in te], O my theft [o 
fortum meum], O that nocturnal crime of mine [o facinus illud meum 
nocturnum] committed in my sixteenth year? There was nothing 
beautiful about you, for you were nothing but a theft. Are you really 
anything at all [aliquid], that I speak to you like this?16
In this passage, the apostrophe announces a shift from ‘you, my 
God’ (as the main addressee of the book) to ‘you, my theft’ and ‘you, 
my nocturnal crime’. It took me a while to grasp the implications of 
this shift and even then it was continuously slipping away from me. As 
usual, brief moments of insight were immediately followed by longer 
periods of despair and incomprehension. “Nevertheless,” I assured 
myself, “this passage is of much more significance than Burke (or even 
Derrida) suggests.17 The dialogical structure of the book as a whole is 
at stake.”
It occurred to me that the passage was a perverse imitation of the 
form of the confession as such. It brings Augustine to a point where it 
becomes impossible to sustain his confession, because it is no longer 
 15 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, book 7-9, trans. Harold Edgeworth Butler 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1922), 397. I have cited the 1922 
Loeb Classical Library edition as it suits the context here. Recently Loeb produced 
a new edition in the translation of Russell, where the full passages reads: “Speech 
‘averted’ [aversus] from the judge, which is called Apostrophe, is also remarkably 
effective, whether (1) we turn on the adversary (‘What was that sword of yours 
doing, Tubero, on the field of Pharsalus?’) or (2) proceed to some kind of invocation 
(‘On you I call, ye hills and groves of Alba’) or (3) to an appeal designed to create 
odium (‘O Porcian and Sempronian laws!’).” Quintilian. The Orator’s Education, 
Volume IV: Books 9-10, trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 55. The term ‘apostrophe’ comes from ancient Greek 
(Quintilian uses the Greek script) and literally means ‘turning way.’ It is used as 
“a figure of speech in which a thing, a place, an abstract quality, an idea, a dead 
or absent person, is addressed as if present and capable of understanding.” J.A. 
Cuddon, A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 5th ed. (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 49.
 16 conf. 2, 6, 12 (trans. based on Bourke): “Quid ego miser in te amavi, o furtum 
meum, o facinus illud meum nocturnum sexti decimi anni aetatis meae? non enim 
pulchrum eras, cum furtum esses. aut vero aliquid es, ut loquar ad te?”
 17 Cfr Burke, Rhetoric of Religion, 98; Jacques Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon,” in 
Without Alibi, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2002), 82.
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addressed to God, but to the nothingness of the theft. The rhetorical 
effect is striking: while describing the moment when he was furthest 
removed from God, Augustine interrupts his confession to God and 
starts addressing his theft instead. “At the heart of recounting the pear 
theft,” I told myself, “Augustine literally turns his back to God, briefly 
re-enacting this moment within the dialogic structure of the text itself.” 
It reminded me of how Augustine describes the theft later on when 
he asks himself the following: “was I, while being a captive, imitating a 
crippled freedom (mancam libertatem) by doing what was forbidden 
without being punished, in a shadowlike parody of omnipotence 
(omnipotentiae similitudine)?”18 
Was Augustine’s apostrophe not a similar kind of parody? Perhaps 
a deliberate one? After all, it imitates the form of the Confessions, while 
directing itself to an addressee that ultimately has no substance. It 
was as if Augustine was already aware of the charges that Feuerbach 
would later bring against Christianity, refuting them by showing how 
a true case of projection (directly addressing the theft) differed from 
a confession to God. 
It is true that Augustine uses the apostrophe in several other places.19 
What made this one different? All this time, I had a sense what it was, 
without being able to pin it down. Nowhere else was the apostrophe 
put to use with greater rhetorical effect than here. Why was that? 
Slowly I started to see what it was. The interruption of the confession 
as such, the displacement of the ego/tu dynamic, all these things 
pointed towards the importance of the addressee. “For Augustine,” 
I said to myself, “God is the one who initiates the confessions, he is 
the condition of possibility to say anything truthful about oneself. The 
apostrophe highlights this address, by shifting it to its opposite.” Once 
I grasped this, it seemed so obvious that I could hardly believe I had 
not seen it before. Every page of the Confessions suddenly appeared to 
reiterate it.
In this way, I stumbled upon Augustine’s second strategy: constantly 
invoking God as his addressee and making sure that the reader never 
 18 conf. 2, 6, 14 (trans. based on Bourke):“…Quia potentatu non poteram ut mancam 
libertatem captivus imitarer, faciendo impune quod non liceret tenebrosa 
omnipotentiae similitudine?”
 19 E.g. conf. 2. 6, 14; 2, 9, 17. For a full list of the apostrophe’s used in the Confessions 
as well as some general remarks on their interpretation, see O’Donnell, Augustine 
Confessions: Vol. 2: Commentary, Books 1-7, 87.
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forgets to whom the confession is addressed and for what reason. 
Something still bothered me about all this. After all, what I just said 
seems to imply a double addressee: God and the reader. “How does 
that work?” I wondered. “Can these two addressees be separated? 
Augustine clearly thinks they can be. But how?”
Self-Effacement and Deliberate Plagiarism
It is only in Chapter 3 of Book 2 that Augustine explicitly mentions the 
second addressee of his book: the reader. Before that, he only addresses 
God, never even mentioning that he is aware of another audience as 
well. Chapter 3 opens with a narration about what happened around 
the time Augustine was sixteen. “My studies were interrupted during 
that year, when I was brought back from Madaura.”20 Midway, as if 
a new thought suddenly struck him, Augustine reflects on his own 
narration:
Who am I telling this to? Not you, my God [deus meus], but in front of 
you [apud te] I am telling my own kind, the human race, about it, no 
matter how few of them may happen upon these writings of mine. For 
what reason? So that I [ego], and whoever reads this [quisquis haec 
legit], may realise out of what depths one must cry out to you [ad te]. 
What is closer to your ears than a heart that confesses [confitens] to 
you and a life founded on faith [vita ex fide[?21
At first, this statement bewildered me. It seemed as if Augustine 
suggests here that he was not addressing God after all, but was 
instead speaking to the human race. Before long it occurred to me 
that Augustine was not so much talking about the recipient of his 
narration, but rather about its content. His question, ‘Who am I telling 
 20 conf. 2, 3, 5 (trans. Bourke): “Et anno quidem illo intermissa erant studia mea, dum 
mihi reducto a Madauris.”
 21 conf. 2, 6, 14 (trans. based on Bourke): “Cui narro haec? neque enim tibi, deus 
meus, sed apud te narro haec generi meo, generi humano, quantulacumque ex 
particula incidere potest in istas meas litteras. et ut quid hoc? ut videlicet ego 
et quisquis haec legit cogitemus de quam profundo clamandum sit ad te. et 
quid propius auribus tuis, si cor confitens et vita ex fide est?” For an extensive 
analysis and comparison of several translations of this passage (among which that 
of Bourke), cfr Burton Raffel, The Art of Translating Prose (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 71-76.
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this to?’ comes to the fore in light of the omniscience ascribed to God. 
There is no need to tell God these things, since he already knows 
them. It remains addressed to God, but in front of God (signified by 
apud te), Augustine also speaks to himself (signified by ego) and his 
readers (signified by quisquis haec legit). His point is that, even when 
he provides details about his own life, he only does so to highlight the 
need for confession.
Augustine often comes back to this point, as it is important for 
him to avoid the impression that he is engaged in self-glorification 
or attempts to further his own agenda. He expresses this particularly 
well in an extraordinary passage from Book 10 that took me a while to 
translate properly. “Partly because I only have a shaky grasp on Latin,” 
I admitted to myself. “Partly because it says something essential about 
the dialogical structure that underlies the confession as such.” To 
unpack this passage, I will divide it in three parts:
I have been speaking about the rewards of my confession, not with 
words of the body and the voice [verbis carnis et vocibus], but with 
words of the soul and cries of the mind [verbis animae et clamore 
cogitationis], recognised by your ear.22
Even though the Confessions is built up with the words of the body 
and the voice, Augustine believes they were preceded by a more 
fundamental inner confession that was expressed by words of the soul 
and cries of the mind. This reiterates his point that God is his primary 
addressee, highlighting that God is the defining figure in the dialogical 
structure of the confession. Augustine continues: 
For when I am wicked, confessing to you [confiteri tibi] means nothing 
else than being displeased with myself [displicere mihi]; and when I am 
pious, confessing to you [confiteri tibi] simply means not attributing 
it to myself [tribuere mihi]. For you, Lord, bless the just [iustum], but 
first you rectify [iustificas: make just] their impiety. That is why my 
confession to you, my God, is made silently in your sight, and yet not 
silently: for it is silent in sound, but cries out in affection.23
 22 conf. 10, 2, 2 (trans. based on Bourke): “Et quo fructu tibi confitear, dixi, neque 
id ago verbis carnis et vocibus, sed verbis animae et clamore cogitationis, quem 
novit auris tua.”
 23 Ibid., “Cum enim malus sum, nihil est aliud confiteri tibi quam displicere mihi: 
cum vero pius, nihil est aliud confiteri tibi quam hoc non tribuere mihi, quoniam 
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There is an interesting causality at play here. God blesses people 
who are just, but they can only become just insofar as God first made 
them so. The circle starts and ends with God. The self only plays a 
role there to the extent that it effaces itself. Without this effacement, 
confession is not possible. In its final sentences this paragraph—“Or 
rather a confession about confessing,” I said to myself—comes to a 
crucial culmination when Augustine states:
I cannot say anything true to other people unless you would first hear 
[tu prius audieris] it from me [a me], nor can you hear any such thing 
from me [a me] unless you would first tell [tu prius dixeris] me.24
“Why is it,” I wondered, while pondering this striking sentence, “that 
the causal order is somewhat reversed here?” I was well aware that 
such a reversal of time was sometimes employed to create a rhetorical 
effect. In classical rhetoric this is called a hysteron proteron, putting 
first what should be last.25 The classical example comes from Virgil’s 
Aeneid, “But let us die, rushing into the thick of battle.”26 Virgil uses 
it to highlight the desperate position of the Trojans. “One hope saves 
the defeated: they know they can’t be saved!”27 It was not yet clear to 
me, however, what Augustine’s tried to achieve here by reversing the 
logical order.
After studying the sentence a bit more closely, I started to 
realise that the hysteron proteron provided the right direction for 
interpreting it, but did not fully cover it. “It is more complicated than 
that,” I told myself. “In fact, it is a ring structure: saying – hearing 
– hearing – saying.” This did not fully explain it either. After all, the 
causal relationship between hearing and saying was still messed up. 
Augustine starts by identifying himself as the speaker (saying). Then 
he goes on to describe his secondary audience, other people, and 
tu, domine, benedicis iustum, sed prius eum iustificas impium. confessio itaque 
mea, deus meus, in conspectu tuo tibi tacite fit et non tacite: tacet enim strepitu, 
clamat affectu.” 
 24 Ibid., “Neque enim dico recti aliquid hominibus quod non a me tu prius audieris, 
aut etiam tu aliquid tale audis a me quod non mihi tu prius dixeris.”
 25 Hysteron Proteron, “a figure of speech which reverses the logical or chronological 
order of things; it comes from Gr. for ‘latter former’.” Jonathon Green, Dictionary of 
Jargon (London: Routledge, 2015), 293.
 26 Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 2010), 87: “Moriamur 
et in media arma ruamus.” (translation slightly altered).
 27 Ibid., “Una salus victis, nullam sperare salute.”
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his primary audience, God, as the first listener (hearing). He ends by 
indicating that God, as primary audience, only hears from Augustine 
(hearing) what he has first told him (saying). 
Something seems off though. God is both the first to hear and the 
first to speak. Moreover, there is no mention of Augustine role as a 
listener. “Isn’t that the crucial moment, though?” I asked myself. “Isn’t 
Augustine’s whole point that he can only tell his readers what he has 
first heard from God?” Given that, how can he write himself out of the 
dialogical structure that is set up here? It seemed to me, something 
important was at stake here. Important to Augustine, that is.
“It must have something to do,” I told myself, “with Augustine’s 
earlier distinction between the words of the soul and the words of 
the body.” When I started thinking about this a bit more, it suddenly 
dawned on me that, for Augustine, a confession always has to appear 
twice: first as words of the soul (directed to God) then as words of 
the body (directed to the self and other people). “That is,” I thought 
to myself, “how serious Augustine takes his self-effacement. For him, 
neither the cause (speaking) nor the effect (hearing) can be ascribed 
to the self.” Augustine lacks God’s ear. That’s why he cannot even hear 
the words of his own soul. He receives the words from someone else, 
someone who was the first to hear them: God. 
“But how then does Augustine receive these words,” I asked myself, 
“if he is not even seen as a listener in relation to them?” It seemed 
that for Augustine, the saying and the hearing coincide. “But who is 
speaking?” I wondered. “Whose voice is heard?” This brings us to 
the heart of the issue. Augustine has to find a fine balance between 
two voices: his own voice and that of God. In fact, it seems that the 
doubling of the confession can only happen if these two voices merge 
in some way or another. “But that is nearly impossible,” I thought to 
myself. “Either one ascribes human words to God, opening oneself 
up to Feuerbach’s projection charge; or one appropriates the divine 
words and ascribes them to oneself, which can easily slip into a 
deification of the self.” To avoid these two scenarios Augustine has to 
ensure that the blending of voices never gives way to an ascribing the 
self or to an appropriating the other. Augustine tries to achieve this by 
combining a radical self-effacement with the subtle art of plagiarizing 
God. This double movement defines the ego/tu dynamic underlying 
the Confessions as a whole. 
“Of course,” I told myself, “all of this is still a carefully constructed 
rhetorical strategy that, ultimately, can be traced back to Augustine’s 
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own convictions.” Even when Augustine is quoting the words of God 
from scripture, they are still moulded by the context of his text and 
adapted to the rhythm and tone of his sentences. Or rather, the two 
texts—that of scripture and that of Augustine—are mutually shaping 
each other. It is only through the words of the Bible that Augustine 
can understand himself, making his own confession possible. At the 
same time, he can only speak about himself—“Literally inserting 
himself into the text,” I said to myself—by merging the words of the 
Bible with his own, only highlighting the self by immediately effacing 
it. This dramatisation of self-effacement—“Enacted in the language of 
the Bible,” I added in my head—makes the Confessions such a powerful 
and effective book.
“What about my own notes?” I asked myself. “I have presented them 
as being on the verge of becoming confessions, hovering there. Could they 
ever truly transform into confessions in the sense of Augustine? If so, 
to whom will they be addressed?” It was clear to me that Augustine’s 
address — God — was not available to me. Did that mean that the 
confession as a dialogical modus was not available to me either? “Well, 
Rousseau did it!” a voice in my head shouted triumphantly. It is true 
that Rousseau’s French title (Les Confessions) echoes Augustine’s 
Latin one (Confessiones), but that does not mean that they refer to the 
same thing. “Thus I learned,” Rousseau confesses, “that it was not as 
terrible to steal as I had thought.”28 This is a far cry from the world 
of Augustine. In fact, there is little to no self-effacement in Rousseau, 
quite the opposite. “I wish to show my fellows a man in all the truth 
of nature; and this man will be myself.”29 Nor does Rousseau resort to 
the subtle art of plagiarizing God. The confession enters an entirely 
different register in his work.
Confessions in the sense of Augustine required an addressee who 
hears before anything is said. “Who can that be?” I asked myself, “Apart 
from God?” Our former selves, still lingering within us, might have 
some claim to become an addressee like that. “These former selves 
define us while differentiating us from within,” I thought to myself, 
“but are they different enough to become a true addressee? And where 
are they exactly? Do they dwell in our memories only? Or do they have 
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions and, Correspondence, Including the Letters 
to Malesherbes, ed. Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. Stillman, 
trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), 28.
29 Ibid., 5.
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a different mode of existence as well?” What about other people then? 
Those who know us well (parents, partners) are occasionally able to 
grasp what’s bothering us before we ourselves are even aware of it. 
“Point taken,” my inner voice admitted, “but that is still not the same 
thing.” In addition, Augustine never claims that he has some kind of 
privileged access to God (or God to him). On the contrary, God only 
speaks to him through what is available to all: God’s word (the Bible) 
and, God’s creation (Nature). “What is the role of the text in all this?” I 
wondered. “If the Bible can act as an interface for confession, wouldn’t 
other texts be able to so as well? In fact, isn’t that exactly what I have 
tried to do here with Augustine’s Confessions?” If so, then these little 
notes of mine might still become true confessions one day. For now, 
they remain hovering on the border, marking their attempt to become 
confessions while recognizing their inability to do so.
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